FREE ESSAY ON VIETNAM THE UNENDING WAR

VIETNAM THE UNENDING WAR

The Vietnam war is the most terrible and senseless war America has ever fought. Never
since their own civil war was the world most powerful country divided in such terrible
anger. The leading historian on the war in Vietnam George C. Herring poses two very
important questions in his essay American and Vietnam the Unending War. These two
questions have been boggling the Americans minds since the beginning of the war in
Indochina up to today when the US faces similar crises but is afraid to due to something
called the Vietnam syndrom something that has plagued the American minds since the cease
fire in Vietnam 1975. Why did the united States invest so much blood and treasure in an
area so remote and of so little apparent significance, and secondly, why despite its vast
power did the United States fail to achieve its objects? Herring approaches these
questions from a variety of different sides which somewhat explain the struggle and the
pain the misunderstood country had to go through.
After WWII most of the countries such as Britain and the Netherlands gave up their
colonies in Indochina. France on the other hand decided to regain power and put down the
revolutionary nationalistic movement, by force that was plaguing Vietnam. The communist
Ho Chi Minh had developed a communist, nationalistic movement against the french in order
to be free of colonialism and establish a Marxist state in Vietnam. France at the time
and still today is one of Americas strongest allies. Therefore and for many other
political reasons, such as the prevention of the spread of communism, made the US aid
France and support them with their mission. This was so to say the beginning of a variety
of incidents that finally brought the US to war with Vietnam.
Of all the nationalistic movements and revolutions in Indochina, the Vietnamese was the
only one supported by communism. This was of great concern to the U.S. who feared that
the soviet union had their hands in this as a plan of slowly gaining power over the
entire east, and eventually the entire world. Herring writes From the outset Americans
viewed Ho and the Vietminh as instruments of the Soviet drive for world domination,.....
After the fall of china to communism in 1949, the US feared that if then also Vietnam
would fall to communism finally the rest of Indochina, which found itself in similar
unstable conditions as Vietnam, will fall to communism to.
Soviet expansion had reached a point beyond which it must be permitted to go. A so-called
domino theory was adopted, where when one falls all will eventually fall. Herring
explains: Because of its location on china's southern border and because it appeared in
the most imminent danger, Vietnam was considered crucial. If it fell, all of Southeast
Asia might be lost, denying the United States access to important raw materials and
strategic waterways.
After the defeat of France in 1954, the US aided to create a non-Communist, democratic,
south Vietnamese state in hope that their financial aid and political assistance would
strengthen the population and prevent any further spreading of Communism. The Cold War
started taking desperate measures and the U.S. particularly in the Kennedy-Johnson era
was very concerned with the security of western Europe. It was the US concern that if
they would back out in the worsening Vietnam situation, it would portray a certain
weakness to its enemy Russia and could provoke conflicts in western Europe, particularly
over Berlin, that could end in a nuclear war. ...if they showed firmness in one area, it
would deter the adversary in a another; if they showed weakness the adversary would be
tempted to take steps that might leave no option but nuclear war. 
A further reason Herring portrays is the effect on the political situation at home which
could have been quit crucial if Vietnam would have pulled out. Another loss to communism
would have devastating outcomes on presidential elections. To prevent loss of votes
marked another great aspect of why the Presidential administrations couldn't simply leave
Indochina to its destiny.
Harring writes ...the assumption shared by administrations from Harry S. Truman to Lyndon
B. Johnson that the fall of Vietnam to communism would have disastrous political
consequences at home. 
These main reasons, the prevention of the spread of Communism, the prevention of Nuclear
war in Europe, together with political issues and troubles developing and finally to show
its determination to defend its vital world interests, the United States put them selves
in a position that was brave yet damaging its image all over the world. The point of
prevention of nuclear war is particularly back up by Professor Francis X. Winters in his
book The Year of the Hare. In his close study on the years of the Kennedy administration
and the undergone coup on the South vietnamese leader and long term Allie Ngo Dinh Diem,
he makes clear that it was Kennedy's idea to keep on focusing on Vietnam in order to
distract a War that could have otherwise happened in Europe and could have meant the end
of humanity or at least the destruction of the entire northern hemisphere. 
Winters writes For I was to discover during interviews in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
that President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk had raised the American ante in
Vietnam precisely in order to lower the risk of a nuclear confrontation in a European
war.
In order to get Khrushchev attention off a nuclear war in Europe Kennedy believed that
the conflict in Vietnam would create distraction and would demonstrate determination.
Winters writes He [Kennedy] had tried to convince Khrushchev of US determination but had
failed. It was now essential to demonstrate our firmness and determination. The ethical
backgrounds to these decisions are debatable but we know one thing today fore shore and
tat is that their was no nuclear war. Winters puts great emphasis on one point in the
Kennedy administration and that is that Kennedy simply wanted to stay in Vietnam until
his reelection. We have no future in Vietnam. They're going to kick our assess out of
there. I can't give up on Vietnam before 1964. I couldn't go out there and ask for
reelection after giving up two pieces of territory [Laos and Vietnam] to Communism. There
is proven eviden that he wanted to leave Vietnam after his was reelected. Unfortunately
Kennedy failed to discuss this with his vice president, who in desperation of trying to
act on the accounts of his predecessor after his assassination, could have probably acted
differently if he had known. When President Lyndon B. Johnson went into office, he
received a lot of trouble, so he simply tried to finish what Kennedy had started. Winters
writes:  'I cannot now repudiate my predecessors commitments.' Johnson, of course had not
been among the handful of friends and advisors who knew of Kennedy's intention to quit
Vietnam before he was overtaken by fate.
Herring portray's in his book LBJ and Vietnam that there was nothing President Johnson
wanted more than get away from this harrowing war. Unfortunately there where only very
few options for him to undertake that where outlined by his advisors after Americans had
been deliberately attacked several times in South Vietnam. To take the loss and get
everybody out and eventually look weak, some middle thing or to send troops. What other
option should LBJ have undergone in spite of the few he had. On the other hand, who could
have predicted that the resistence by North Vietnam would have such a outcome. This
brings us to the other question herring tries tp answer in his essay. The question why
America, the number one super power of the world, failed to achieve its objects. 
Herring explains in his essay that the U.S. troops where simply not trained to fight a
war in a place such as Vietnam. It was fought in a climate an a terrain that were
singularly inhospitable: thick jungles, foreboding swamps and paddies, rugged mountains,
insufferable heat and humidity. Furthermore the large cultural gap and the lack of
regular war objectives made it hard for the American forces to fight a serious war. Lack
of understanding the language or the culture of the Vietnamese made it hard for Americans
to understand who was enemy and who friend. Their mission was at best morally ambiguous
and, however benevolent their intentions, Americans often found themselve on the wrong
side of Vietnamese nationalism. America was trained in conventional warfare such as in
the World Wars and Korea, this unconventional warfare the U.S. faced in Vietnam made it
hard to even estimate how one was doing. And there was always the gnawing- but
fundamental - question, first raised by John F. Kennedy: how can we tell if we are
winning? Their was no real battle line, no real objectives no real sense of victory, the
only way to estimate one's progress was by the notorious body count. Furthermore Herring
complains that their was no foundation on which to build nationhood. After their last
war, the economy had suffered incredibly and their was no real government nor elite to
run the country or to work with the U.S., because the french had destroyed the political
order. Finally, Herring describes that the United States simply underestimated its enemy
and its determination and staying power.  They skillfully employed the strategy of
protracted war, already tested against France, perceiving that the Americans, like the
french, would become impatient and, if they bled long enough, might weary of the war. 
Winters answers this question on one similar account as Herring, and that is that their
was no government to fight with. But instead of blaming it on the french as Herring does
he blames the American government and particularly the Kennedy administration who decided
to assassinate their South vietnamese Allie and by doing so completely wipe out the South
Vietnamese government. For he agreed with the analysis of the CIA and of the former
ambassador Nolting that such a coup would be an invitation to governmental chaos
throughout South Vietnam and would ruin the war effort. Robert Kennedy recognized this
and blurted out at some meeting before the coup  This makes no sense on the face of
it.... to support a coup would be putting the future of Vietnam and in fact all of
Southeast Asia in the hands of one man not now known to the U.S.... Unfortunately the
U.S. government was not able to recognize this until it was to late. America lost the war
because it blew away South Vietnam's government, you can't win a war without a stable
government. 
By looking at the principal personalities involved in this conflict it shows that a
certain arrogance and self interest was the drive to a number of decisions which
eventually turned a local conflict into a major international clash. Such personalities
involve Dean Rusk, President Kennedy, the President of South Vietnam Diem, President
Johnson, and more. Most of the characters such as JFK and Johnson did what they did in
Indochina in order to ashore reelection. Characters such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk
acted on the accounts of American patriotism and the ideology that every country should
be molded after the perfect democratic country the United States. The Vietnamese
government was dismissed by Rusk and others because it contradicted irreconcilably their
own ascendant Enlightenment formula of democracy. It is understood that President
Kennedy's personal interest for reelection was his primary implication to stay in
Vietnam. After his reelection in 1964, he was planing on leaving Indochina and leaving it
to its own faith. Furthermore President Johnson just wanted to finish what his
predecessor had started, a mission that cost him great remorse. South Vietnamese
President Diem was fighting for a free South Vietnam. All he wanted is to be independent
without having any strings attached. His problem was that he was planning a different
democratic reform as the Americans had in mind, which succeeded in his assassination.
Diem, for example was planing democratic reform on a different scale and calender than
his American (and Vietnamese) critics. It is clear that Vietnam was Americas only
foothold in Southeast Asia and that it was therefore necessary to the U.S. that its
government would execute its exact orders or face damnation. 
Regarding the ethical issues of the war it is clear that for one the US once more had to
impose its chauvinistic ideals on another nation, and try to mold them in its own image.
Furthermore it demonstrates that in some countries non democratic but rather autocratic
governments make more sense due to their tradition and culture. It is debatable if the
outcome would have differed if America would have let Diem act on his own terms. It would
have been very unlike of the US government to do so regarding its history. 
Herring sketches several positive aspects out of the war. The fact that no nuclear
conflict happened probably because of Vietnam and that by showing its determination and
endurance America probably intimidated the soviet union. Finally he accounts that the
lost war might have been a part of winning the cold war. ...a lost battle in a Cold War
eventually won. This though is not the answer to justify the Misery the US brought to
Vietnam. Much rather it is a perfect example for American Imperialism and the suppression
of communistic ideals in total self interest and not to help any one.