FREE ESSAY ON MULTI LATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MULTI LATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS

When President Bill Clinton was inaugurated in 1993, he stressed a new policy concerning a
revived United Nations and the actions that would be taken by the United States
concerning the "New World Order," a term coined by his predecessor George Bush depicting
the post-Cold War international arena. Clinton had campaigned on the need for a
multilateral organization to share costs and share risks of any peacekeeping venture. The
Clinton Administration had made multilateralism a campaign issue and put it in the
forefront of their foreign policy agenda. However, with the problems occurred during the
initial trial period of this assertive multilateralism, exemplified by US military
blunders in Somalia, Clinton and his advisors now found themselves questioning their own
policies and preferences in foreign affairs especially in terms of multilateral peace
operations. This case study delves into these issues and how Clinton and his
administration sought answers to this problematic puzzle.
The main operations of the United Nations are humanitarian relief efforts, peacekeeping
by invitation and peace enforcement. The latter entails the most danger and conflict
situations. These are soldiers trained to fight, not make peace. This is, and always will
be, an enigma for those associated with peacekeeping operations. The same forces that are
meant to keep the peace for a UN peacekeeping mission have been trained all their lives
to make war, not peace. Your warmakers are your peacemakers. This will always cause
confusion and disruption in any relief efforts involving peacekeeping operations. 
The case study attempts to explain the problems encountered during multilateral peace
operations. Certain issues must first be addressed. The national interest of the United
States is first and foremost. This is the key to making peace or to making war. The issue
of whom is in command and who is in control is also an important factor as is the time
frame in which the US will remain involved.
Certain issues that became hot topics of debate among Clinton's advisors were those of
the Rapid Reaction Force and the idea of private UN forces. The latter fell into ill
favor with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell, who did not like the
circumstances of a separate US military entity solely used as a mechanism of the UN. The
benefits of a Rapid Reaction Force were many. They could be deployed quickly. They would
also alternate countries. A database would be created; therefore the US would not always
have to go on the respective missions called on by the UN. 
The case study completes while examining the choices Clinton finally made regarding
multilateral peace operations. He used the advice of his two closest cabinet members to
this issue in an attempt to reach a resolution: Powell and Secretary of State Madeline
Albright. Albright wanted to practice assertive multilateralism and use the UN forces
only when it benefited the US. She said that the US should always try a multilateralist
approach to the respective situation, and if there is no sharing and they receive no
international support but the issue at stake is in it vital national interest, the US
will go on alone. Powell was against the practice as a whole. He did not look too kindly
on the idea of the US engaging in an unknown war, at an unknown time and under an unknown
command. Powell also hesitated to support a military venture with unknown goals, unknown
missions and an unknown in the controlling offices. 
The finality of the situation was that the Clinton Administration was way too optimistic
on the idea of world peace. They were not realistic. Multilateralism can work, but it
mustn't be the centerpiece of a foreign policy agenda as Clinton had sought it to be. The
reasons why Clinton eventually took this approach were three-fold. The military,
exemplified by Powell's emphatic stance, were against the entire idea. Congress, after
Somalia, was weary of further intervention, as was the public. This case study details
the problems that can occur within an administration when ideological differences abound,
particularly between military and political players.