FREE ESSAY ON JUAN DOMINGO PERON: ARGENTINE MASTER OF LABOR AND LEADER OF THE MASSES

JUAN DOMINGO PERON: ARGENTINE MASTER OF LABOR AND LEADER OF THE MASSES

Juan Domingo Peron, born in 1895 in Lobos, Argentina, was the President of Argentina on
two occasions separated by eighteen years. He first came to power by the election of
February 28,1946. He ruled for almost ten years until he was pressured to resign by the
Argentine military and in September of 1955 he left the country. He spent almost the next
twenty years in exile but never lost touch with the Argentine people and especially the
Argentine labor movement. In 1973, after eighteen years of exile, Peron returned to
Argentina and was elected president again with his third wife Isabel as vice-president.
His power as a ruler came out of the special connection that he made with the working
classes and unions before and during his first term. Peron was a military man by trade,
attending the National Military Academy at age fifteen. He became a captain by 1924 and a
professor of military history by 1930. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1936 and
was named minister of war during the unrest and bloodless coup of 1944. Peron got his
first experience with labor as the head of the National Labor Department. That position
evolved into the head of the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare just over a month
later in December of 1944. Right away Peron required that all employers give employees a
one month's pay bonus every year. This was the beginning of a series of policies that
would make Peron the labor union's president. His ability to come back to power after
being out of the country for so long was the product of his close relationship with the
labor forces and working class. There are however a few special factors that must be
considered when making this claim; namely the background of the labor movement and the
way in which labor continued to follow Peronist ideas even after Juan was gone from
office. These labor forces developed such tremendous loyalty to Juan Peron as a result of
his special brand of politics which provided that the economic solvency of the working
class was the biggest priority of the government. 
Organized labor in Argentina before the golpe of 1943 was in a state of constant change
and motion. Beginning with the golpe de estado that overthrew president Hipolito Yrigoyen
in September of 1930, the political climate of Argentina was a turmoiltuous backdrop for
the labor movement. The formation of the Conferatcion General del Trabajo [CGT] took
place in the same year. The CGT was a conglomerate of the largest labor unions in the
country, like railroad workers unions, construction workers unions and textile workers
unions. This marked the beginning of a new type of unionization. The unions that formed
between 1930 and 1943 were not only larger and more directed at labor than trades, but
they were willing to cooperate with the government. They were bread-and-butter unions,
now less interested in being in opposition to the state because they had gotten into
industries that required more cooperation with the government like railroads for example.
(Barager, 1968) The unions started to establish some general trends in their practices in
terms of labor management relations. The basic foundations for these relations were
collective bargaining and trade-union social insurance, which Peron later adapted for his
own use.
The social climate in Argentina was also receptive to unionization in the decades prior
to Peron's first time in office. Immigration had all but come to a halt by 1930 which
meant that the greater percentage of laborers were second generation Argentines and were
more nationalist in leanings. This was another factor that led to the cooperationist
nature of the new unions. Unions in general were getting larger with the migration of
large sectors of the Argentine population from the countryside to the urban areas as a
result of a failing agrarian economy in the thirties. The global economic depression that
took place in the thirties had the greatest effect on the farmers which when coupled with
accelerating industrialization provided all of the necessary conditions for urbanization
in Argentina. Urbanization and it's effect on the size and face of the work force also
aided in the move toward unionization in the thirties.
By 1942 the CGT, by then the largest union in Argentina, had split into two major
factions. The first was in favor of the re-election of General Jose Domenech to the
position of Union Secretary General. This faction had more socialist leanings and
consisted mainly of the railroad workers unions. This first group became known as CGT1.
The group that would be known as CGT2 consisted mainly of construction workers, metal
workers and textile workers unions, which were communist led unions. This second faction
wanted the election of Francisco Perez Leiros who happened to be a socialist. This void
revolved around the issue of the level of involvement in politics that the union should
have. The majority of the CGT; namely the CGT2, were of the bread-and-butter mindset that
their union should serve the economic concerns of its members only. The CGT1, whose
ideological leanings were more socialistic were more interested in the political aspect
of labor relations and did not believe that adequate representation of the workers was
possible without becoming involved in national politics. When Peron became the head of
The National Department of Labor in 1944 he theoretically reconciled the two positions by
bringing politics to the Unions as the CGT1 wanted, but only in a way as to aid directly
in the economic situation of the workers, hence satisfying the communist union leaders of
the CGT2. Although in theory his policy had been able to meld the two positions, as both
the communists and the socialists needs were met, the middle level leaders of the unions
could not be brought to agreement or compromise in their opinions. This dissent among the
middle level leaders would never really go away for Peron.
On June 4, 1943 the military in Argentina, which had been serving as the ultimate law of
the land since the golpe de estado of 1930, took control of the government. The reasons
behind this golpe were mostly related to the circumstances of World War II. In Argentina
prior to WWII the general sentiment was that of sympathy for the Axis powers. Peron
himself had been an observer in the Italian army in 1939. When it came time for Argentina
to take sides in the war, however, there was a general fear of becoming allied with
either side given the already shaky domestic political situation. The election scheduled
for the end of 1943 showed promise that a president would be elected with some allied
sympathies, Patron Costas. Costas was a pro-British landowner who many assumed would draw
Argentina into the war on the side of the allies. The military intervened and took over
the government to avoid this pro-ailed president coming to power. The military insurgence
was led by General Pedro Pablo Ramirez, and Peron was among the higher ranking military
leaders involved. Peron was rewarded with the positions of undersecretary of war, head of
the National Labor Department and later vice-president of the country. The first actions
of the military regime were to suspend the constitution and the congress and to disband
the CGT2. The communist sympathies of the CGT2 were the primary reason for it's
suppression. The military government had come to save Argentina from jumping into the war
on the allied side and temporarily achieved that goal.
The original goal of the golpe had been ignored by the end of March 1945 when Argentina
declared war on Germany and Japan. This was a political maneuver to be sure, as the war
was practically over by this time, but the declaration was still a departure from the
original plans of the golpe. By September of 1943 there were widespread demonstrations
against the military government in Argentina. The military group was in need of some
support from pockets of civilians. Peron had made the secretariat of labor so involved in
collective bargaining agreements that the workers looked fondly on his power. He was
often credited with improvements in the workplace more so than the employers who agreed
to them. Through several successful interventions in bargaining Peron made the labor
movement into a powerful political machine for himself, while at the time it served as
the civilian support that the military government needed. Despite his role in making the
military government more palatable for the masses, there was still dissent within the
regime and on October 9, 1945 he was forced to resign from his positions by President
Farrell. He left the offices and was arrested by the state. By October 13 his friends and
supporters were organizing a labor protest. On October 16 workers from all over the
country began organizing in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aries. They had come from all
over the city and around the country as well, as Peron had reached out to agrarian
workers as well as urbanized factory workers. By the end of the day Peron was released
from his arrest on the Isla de Martin Garcia and the next day he appeared on the balcony
of the Casa Rosada in Buenos Aries before thousands of cheering workers.
After his release he declined the invitation to return to his political positions so that
he could run for president instead. He was responsible for the formation of three
political parties, although only one directly. The Partido Laborista was the party under
which he ran for office and it was made up primarily of trade union officials from around
the republic. Two other parties that spontaneously formed threw in their lot with Peron.
The Renovated Radical Party was made up of a group of radical party leaders who left the
mainstream liberal party. The Independent ticket as they called themselves were made up
of random elements of the socio-political spectrum. The election was held on February 24,
1946. With the support of these three parties Peron won the election in a fairly
convincing manner, with 52 percent of the vote and his nearest opponent received only 42
percent. It was the first truly honest election in Argentina since 1928. 
The legacy of this rise to power for Peron was in the support that he gained in the
working classes. The majority of common workers in Argentina in 1946 felt a stronger tie
with Peron than with their union leaders because Peron had been so intimately involved in
their struggles. In his presidency he continued to address the needs of the masses
because he was very politically aware of the need to do so. He believed that one must
adapt the country to the world's evolution by bringing justice to the people. (Hodges,
1988) This focus on the people was a priority throughout Peron's regime. Peron's motto
for his system which he called justicialism was Political sovereignty, economic
independence, social justice. (Whitaker, 1956) This motto conveys a sense of the perfect
balance of the three elements included, but not accidentally, the element of freedom is
missing from this characterization. Accusations that Peron had some elements of fascism
in his politics come from the fact that many freedoms in Argentina were suppressed by his
regime. He was, after all, a military man before he was a labor leader and his rule was a
delicate balance of labor sympathy and military control. He did suppress the voices of
parties who opposed him beginning with any and all labor parties. Juan and Evita Peron
eliminated union leaders who were anti-Peronist in their loyalties and replaced them with
officials of Peron's choice. (Barager, 1968) His regime was not without incident, which
certainly comes as no surprise. He authored a new constitution that was accepted by
congress in 1949 which allowed him to run for another term as president. It was during
his second campaign that he established the Peronist Party. He won a second term easily,
but the end of his perfect control was near. He never truly reconciled with certain
factions of the military and in September of 1951 there was a brief revolt against his
regime led by officers of the army who had been jaded by Peron's rule. The revolt was
brief and was put down without major bloodshed. This incident served only to strengthen
Peron's position, as he had good reason to remove officers who had shown dissent. Many of
these officers were imprisoned, leaving the army with less anti-Peronist sentiment than
prior to the revolt. Although the majority of the army was strictly Peronist after the
September 28th unsuccessful uprising, there were other forces of dissent still alive in
the social picture.
At the beginning of his rule Peron had been seeking the support of the Church and had
seen considerable success in that regard. (Whitaker, 1968) But after the first few years
of his regime there developed a fair amount of tension between the Church and Peron. By
1954 Church officials were outraged by measures taken by Peron to legalize divorce and
prostitution as well as the elimination of religion from education. As the Church was
more moved by Peron's policies it began to develop some political machinery of it's own
which was quickly dismantled by Peron's police. (Whitaker, 1968) After a series of
political scuffles and a small riot in Buenos Aries, Peron was excommunicated on June
16th 1955. This may have been one of the final nails in the coffin of his second term in
his first regime. 
Peron steadily lost his hold on the government from the time of his excommunication. The
same day, June 16th elements of the navy and the air force began attacking property of
Peronist loyalists. The army was able to withstand this attack, but it would not be the
last. In July Peron made attempts to save some order by calling for a stop to the
political unrest and ten days later announcing an end to his revolution which had lasted
twelve years. These attempts were met with strong resistance, especially from the leader
of the Radical Party, Arturo Frondizi. On August 31st Peron offered his resignation but
he soon withdrew it when the members of the CGT rose in a mass rally similar to that of
the famous rally of October 17, 1945. This resurgence of Peron's power was again short
lived as by September 22nd a military junta led by General Eduardo Lonardi had gained the
support of parts of every branch of the military and had effectively removed Peron from
office. Peron took refuge on a Paraguayan gunboat and wouldn't return to Argentina as
leader again for another 18 years. General Lonardi became the president of Argentina and
promised a restoration of democracy and constitutional government. By the end of November
the Peronist party had been abolished and Peron's constitution of 1949 had been annulled.
The constitution of 1853 was restored as the framework for the government. The movement
that had removed Peron from power was called the Revolucion Libertadora, but this
liberating revolution would not be able to liberate itself from the chains of the workers
who clung to Peron even in his 18 years of absence. 
From the start of the new regime it was quite clear that the ideological triumph of the
liberating revolution didn't mean much to the labor union members who had been supported
and given support to Peron. The bureaucrats of the CGT were eager to gain the support of
the government and work with the new regime in a positive way, however the members were
not nearly as cooperatively minded. The secretary general of the CGT, Hugo di Pietro,
urged the members to remain calm and not act in a manner as to disturb the regime.
General Lombardi didn't last long as the leader of the new Argentine government; he was
forced to resign on the 13th of November 1955 at which time General Aramburu assumed the
presidency. The essential conflict in these early stages of the state was the
reconciliation of Peronist unions in a non-Peronist state. On November 14th the CGT
called a general strike which was the last action that the government would allow the CGT
to make legally. On that same day the government declared the strike illegal and two days
later the CGT was intervened along with all other unions. It wasn't long before Peron
would begin to exercise his remote control of the movement to resist the liberal
revolution.
In January of 1956 Peron sent a message to the top militants in the movement which was
smuggled into Argentina by Peronist exiles in Chile. Peron called for industrial sabotage
and a political struggle against the dictatorship. (Hodges, 1988) Peron's secret
directive outlined the foundations of the movement. First, the workers were to undertake
actions independently of their former leaders, many of whom had become caught up in the
bureaucracy of the new regime. Secondly the workers were to refuse contact with the new
dictatorship and reject those who made such contact. Thirdly, the home of each member was
supposed to be turned into a single cell for the purpose of establishing an underground
organization. Fourth, the directive suggested that trade unions replace some old leaders
with more militant ones who would support clandestine activity. Fifth and finally, the
trade unions were to organize strike committees, work stoppages, breakdowns and slowdowns
intended to demoralize the new regime. (Hodges, 1988) This call produced immediate
responses from around the nation and by February of 1956 a Clandestine National Command
formed the organizational backbone for all underground Peronist groups. The national
command published it's manifesto demanding the return of Peron in the same month. This
group would prove to be the organization needed to demoralize the government, but only
after the addition of some physical disruption to the ideological resistance. 
The first organized physical move of the resistance took place under the leadership of
General Juan Jose Valle on June 9th 1956. This small attempt at a golpe failed quickly
and as a result of the failure many Peronist sympathizers were assassinated, not to
mention the fact that Valle and other officers were executed at the hands of a firing
squad. Peron began corresponding specifically with John William Cooke, the secretary of
the Peronist Party in the Buenos Aries Province at the time. Cooke became a close advisor
to Peron in his extended discourse with the resistance movement from his exile. In a
letter that Peron sent to Cooke in May of 1957 he said that he favored the use of
psychological warfare. What Peron called an integral war strategically consisted of the
perpetration of social disorders to prepare a new climate of hostilities. (Hodges, 1988)
Clearly Peron had his hand in determining the policies and actions of the national
command in furthering the resistance.
The political power that Peron wielded was displayed in February of 1958 with the
Peron-Frondizi Pact This agreement between the presidential candidate Arturo Frondizi and
Juan Peron was a trade of votes for amnesty. Peron demanded that in order for him to
swing two million votes in Frondizi's direction, the later would need to promise to
legalize the Peronist resistance movement and the Peronist party in addition to a general
amnesty for the imprisoned and exiled Peronists and a restoration of the CGT with
Peronist leadership. Peron was able to give Frondizi the votes to win the election, a
sure sign of the popular might that he possessed, and in return Frondizi did grant the
general amnesty although he did not fulfill the rest of the bargain until 1962. Peron was
content that his deal with Frondizi had strengthened his position and continued to feel
that insurrection was the best way to eventually regain power. In another letter to
Cooke, dated September 16, 1958, mailed from the Dominican Republic, Peron said ...in the
street power is in the hands of those who manipulate the masses...raise problems in the
street through an agitation without precedent... (Hodges, 1988) Through a large number of
small acts of resistance all over the country in addition to more strikes such as the
general strike of January 17-19, 1959 the Peronist party made its presence known and kept
the resistance alive. 
In 1962 Frondizi restored the Peronist party to legitimacy as promised, however after the
elections of that year the results were annulled and the Peronist party was declared
illegal again. The elections that followed were a terrific sign of just how much
political authority Peron possessed even from his exile. He refused to support either
candidate and in so doing the winner, Arturo Illia, received only 25 percent of the
popular vote. (Hodges, 1988) Clearly without the backing of Peron supporters no candidate
could have the mandate of the people. In 1965, amid pressures to allow the reinstatement
of the justicialist party, some compromise was made on the part of the military
government. Peronism was allowed to use the elements of neo-Peronism that had sprung up
around the country as a mode of political expression. In reality the justicialists took
control of candidate selection and important political and ideological issues. In the
election of March 14th 1965 Peronism got a major foothold back into the government,
especially in the Chamber of Deputies were the Peronists had fifty two deputies compared
to the radicals seventy. (James, 1988) In the year that followed Peron sent his wife,
Isabel into Argentina to take up the leadership of the Peronist party and maintain Juan's
ultimate authority which almost seemed in question after the elections of '65. Through
the following seven years general strife within the Peronist party and within the labor
movement continued, but Peron himself stayed strong and the loyalties of his
representatives did not fade. In 1973, amidst great social strife and constant government
turmoil Peron returned to Argentina and was nominated to run for president as the
candidate of the Justicialsist party. He won the election and thus his odyssey of
election and exile and re-election had come full circle (or full cycle). The general
approval with which his return was met on the part of the people was resounding, proof
that he never lost control even while in exile.
The reasons for Peron's ability to stay in control of Argentine politics are many, but
the most important are clear. First off, the loyalty of the working class to Peron was
unsurpassed by any other leader within this time period. There was no one else for the
working class to point to as the cause for the improvement of their working conditions
and payment beginning in 1943. Secondly, physically, the national command under the
direction of John Cooke played a major role in keeping the Peronist resistance alive
through psychological warfare and clandestine resistance efforts. Peron's political
stance may have given him the broad sweeping appeal to enable his return to office also.
Peronism as a ideological system incorporates some elements of communism and some
elements of fascism with some capitalist cooperation and socialist sympathy as well.
Peron is commonly associated with fascism because of his policies regarding dissidents in
the government and repression of dissidents in the society at large. Perhaps even better
ammunition for this claim has been uncovered recently by a historian in Buenos Aries
named Uki Goni. While researching his book entitled Peron and the Germans he came across
untapped resources in the form of recently declassified information at the Argentine
national archives. One such resource is a four thousand page, nine volume set of
transcripts from depositions given by over sixty spies arrested by Argentine secret
police after World War II. Despite this daunting amount of evidence against the Nazi
spies, including their own signed confessions, Peron ordered their release. (Offman,
1998) This type of involvement in Nazi sympathizing in World War II and afterward is
often used as evidence that Peron was a fascist, however his ideology is not nearly that
cut and dry. Peronism as a phenomenon includes the desire to liberate the proletariat
from the oppression of the oligarchy and it was this identification with the working man
that brought Peronism back in the elections of 1973. Repression of the opposition and
general limitations on freedom of speech as elements of Peronism only came about as
pragmatic installations of the times. Because Argentina's political climate was so
turbulent Peron's defense of labor required some stifling of national freedoms. The
result, however, of Peron's ideology was a fierce loyalty amongst the unionized laborers
of the country and the working class in general. The ability of Juan Peron to return to
office in 1973 after eighteen years of absence was evidence that Peronism was the
people's ideology in Argentina and the masses wouldn't give that up.
Bibliography
Books
Barager, Joseph R. 1968. Why Peron Came to Power: The background to Peronism in 
Argentina. New York, Alfred A Knopf. 
Di Tella, Guido. 1983. Argentina Under Peron 1973 - 76. New York, St. Martin's Press. 
Hodges, Donald C. 1988. Argentina, 1943 - 1987 The National Revolution and Resistance. 
Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press. 
James, Daniel. 1988. Resistance and Integration, Peronism and the Argentine Working
Class, 
1946-1976. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
Miguens, Jose Enrique and Turner, Frederick C. Editors. 1983. Juan Peron and the
Reshaping 
Of Argentina. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Skidmore, Thomas E. and Smith, Peter H. 1997. Modern Latin America fourth edition. New 
York. Oxford University Press. 
Tamarin, David. 1985. The Argentine Labor Movement, 1930-1945 A Study In the 
Origins of Peronism. Albuquerque. University of New Mexico Press.
Whitaker, Arthur Preston. 1956. Argentine upheaval: Peron's fall and the new regime. New

York, Praeger. 
Magazines
Offman, Craig. Nov 9, 1998. Hidden Troves Of History. Time International, p22(1).