FREE ESSAY ON INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AS A MODE OF UNION GOVERNANCE

INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AS A MODE OF UNION GOVERNANCE

Intergovernmentalism as a Mode of Union Governance
Part 1: Intergovernmentalism
I. Introduction
II.The Negotiation of the SEA as a Case Study
A. Mode of Political process and Style of Governance
B. Principal Actors and Players
C. Typical Issues of Governance
D. Level of Institutionalization
E. Visibility
Part 2: Beyond the Monolithic Government
I. Case Study: Negotiating the SEA - The National Level (Germany)
A. Goals in general for the 1980s
B. Actors on the National Level
1. Federal Government
a) Bundeskanzleramt
b) Auswartiges Amt
c) Ministries, esp. Agriculture, Finance, Economics
2. Bundestag
3. Bundesrat
4. Political Parties
5. Interest Groups
C. Assessment
II.Factors to Be Considered
A. Liberal Intergovernmentalism
B. Beyond the Monolithic Government 
1. Governments Are not Monolithic 
2. Governments as Agents 
3. Factors Shaping National Policies 
4. Problems 
5. Theoretical Approach? 
C. Assessment
Part 3: Intergovernmentalism and Democracy
I. Intergovernmentalism and Consociational Democracy
II.Accounts, Accountability, Responsibility, Information - A Theoretical 
Approach
A. Ambiguities about Accountability 
1. The Psychology of Accountability 
2. Justification and Action 
3. Neglecting a Long-Run Perspective 
4. Actor Ambiguity 
5. Accountable For What? 
6. Simplification of Causality Through Individual Responsibility 
B. The Importance of Accountability 
1. The Idea of Accountability 
2. Practical Reasons for the Persistence of the Ideal of 
Personal Responsibility
3. The Kantian Aspect of Responsibility
C. The Basis for Accountability: Information
D. Accounts 
1. Unity and Diversity 
2. The Role of Government 
3. Democratic Possibilities 
III. Tentative Deductions
IV.Developments and Some Further Thoughts
A. National Parliaments in the EU
B. The Question of Levels: National / European
C. A Word on Efficacy
Part 1: Intergovernmentalism
I. Introduction
Intergovernmentalism, albeit ringing familiar in theories of integration, has never been
a clearly defined concept of political theory. Various writers imply very different
things when they talk of intergovernmentalism. In particular, it is unclear whether it
relates to 1) institutions (institutional intergovernmentalism), to 2) area fields
(functional intergovernmentalism), or to 3) the Treaty structure (three pillars - formal
intergovernmentalism).
Mostly, scholars and practitioners refer to intergovernmentalism in order to describe
instances in which the voices of the Member States can clearly be heard on the Community
level. Of course, the voices of the Member States can be heard in ways that have only
little in common. It almost is a truism to mention the fact that national influence on
Community processes is directed through different channels:
-  governments; 
-  parliaments; 
-  courts; 
-  public opinion; 
-  political parties; 
-  interests. 
As suggested by the term itself, intergovernmentalism, as referred to by many writers,
often denotes the exercising of Member States control / influence on Community processes
through governments. Here is a brief capsule version, hoping to capture the essence of
that approach (1).
National governments enjoy the possibility of exercising strong influence on Community
processes. This position is most obvious in relation to 1) the Commission and 2) the
Council. 1) Pressure on the Commission can be exerted formally (through government
involvement in expert groups, in regulatory and management committees, and Council
meetings which both the Commission and the Member States governments attend) and
informally (ministers ringing Commissioners; working parties representatives meeting
Commission officials). Also, the procedure of appointment to the Commission plays an
important role. National nomination of Commissioners institutionalizes national input;
national quota systems for senior grades perform a similar function. (However, Commission
officials, of course, are not open to instructions from their home country and for the
most part look for Community-wide interest.) 2) Governmental control / influence in
relation to the Council decision-making process depends on a variety of factors: the size
of the State it represents; the importance of the State for particular negotiations; the
desire of a government to play an active role (Germany, for instance, until the late
1960s, kept a low profile); the capacity of the government to play an active role
(domestic policy considerations such as coalition government, key interest group
opposition, or electoral damage); relations with other governments; the procedure that
applies (majority vote?); the competence of national negotiators (which is often
underestimated - evidence suggests, however, that variations in such competencies are
less between states but between individual negotiators); the arrangements for linking
representatives in the Council with national capitals (which involves two issues: (a) Do
representatives in working parties or COREPER enjoy room for maneuverability and
flexibility - e.g. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands - or less so - e.g.
France, Greece, Ireland, UK - ? (b) Is a government able to co-ordinate its national
position across different sectoral Councils? The UK, for instance, enjoys relatively
favorable conditions and effective co-ordinating mechanisms, such as centralized
governmental system and majority party political system. Due to the following factors,
such co-ordination is more difficult in Germany: coalition government; the relative
autonomy of ministers and ministries within the federal government; the lack of an
authoritative decision-making center, notably in cases of overlapping ministry
competences or if the Chancellor does not act; the independence of the Bundesbank; the
strong powers of the Lander; and the strong sectoral specialization and loyalties to
different federal ministries among the staff of the German Permanent Representation in
Brussels).
Others use the concept of intergovernmentalism in a more theoretical context, in
particular as a counter-movement to neo-functionalism. (2)
I will understand intergovernmentalism as one of three modes of governance within the EU
system (intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, infranationalism). In order to give some
flesh to the bare bones of intergovernmentalism, I shall analyze some of its major
distinguishing features (style of intercourse, mode of political process, principal
actors and players, issues of governance, level of institutionalization, visibility,
transparency) by choosing a concrete example, the negotiation of the SEA (infra II.). In
Part II, I will then point to the analytical problem of a monolithic vision of
government. Part III., finally, shall deal with ways of thinking about the democracy
deficit in the intergovernmental mode of European governance.
II. The Negotiation of the Single European Act [SEA] as a Case Study (3)
A. Mode of political process and style of intercourse
The negotiating history of the SEA is one of the principal examples of interstate
bargaining processes. In contrast to legislative processes, which are above all
characterized through vote counting etc., the process leading to the SEA resembled
multilateral diplomatic treaty negotiations. There were no formal procedures serving as a
framework for the negotiations. Rather, informal shuttle diplomacy (above all by
Mitterrand and Dumas) and bilateral (F-FRG) respectively trilateral (F-FRG-UK) prior
negotiations led to the setting of the agenda and to the forming of an agreement. The
Fontainebleau Summit Meeting and the Intergovernmental Conference itself were by
definition hardly restrained through process rules other than those in place for
multilateral negotiations.
Initiative. The initiative for negotiating the SEA came from the Member States
themselves, not from Community institutions. Above all, initiative did not come from the
Commission whose input, in the supranational mode of governance, is high. To be sure,
Lord Cockfield's bold White Paper and Delors's political sensitivity and swift actions
contributed a great deal to the indeed remarkable speed of decision-making at the IGC.
(4) However, the Commission's actions did not alter at all the substance of the
agreement. The SEA's broader outlines were proposed, negotiated, and, finally, approved
by the Heads of State and Governments themselves, in many instances even before the
Commission came into play. Neither played the Commission an important role at an earlier
stage, when decisive steps were taken to overcome the Europessimism of the early
eighties. It was, in contrast, first the Genscher-Colombo initiative (of 1981) which
called for greater European unity (the Commission did no more than backing it), and later
the French presidency and Mitterrand's personal involvement which eventually to a turning
point (a turning point, one might add, which would have been unthinkable, in the light of
heavy French attacks, on the basis of the Stuttgart Declaration alone). In other words,
the breakthrough in relaunching European integration occurred well before Delors became
President of the Commission, and Moravcsik concludes that Delors' actions as Finance
Minister of France may have contributed more to the SEA than those as president of the
Commission. (5) In the area where the SEA brought the most progress, the internal market,
the end result departs from the Commission's original paper more radically than anywhere
else. (6)
Negotiation / Elaboration. The EP's voice went almost unheard. The Dooge Committee, in
one of its first actions, rejected the EP's Draft Treaty Establishing European Union and
rather began negotiations based on the French government's draft. (7) After
Fontainebleau, Parliament representatives were deliberately excluded from important fora
by government representatives. Both incidents clearly show how little Parliament's input
was. Its protests against the minimalist draft treaty and against the exclusion were
ignored. I cannot think of many more places where the European Parliament's influence is
so small, and where it comes close to being regarded as almost obnoxious and as an
intruder of sorts. It will come as no surprise that the Parliament reacted to the outcome
of the negotiations with disappointment, anger, and sharp critique. (8)
In contrast to any form of legislative bargaining, the negotiations leading to the SEA
were characterized by a remarkable flexibility and the absence of firm, not to mention
rigid or Community-defined, rules of procedure. Many decisions were made in prior
bilateral negotiations, more or less outside the EC institutional framework. Mitterrand
alone met with Kohl and Thatcher six times each during the French Council presidency in
1984. Multilateral meetings took place within a framework provided by the EC, the
European Council. However, the European Council (9) is without doubt the institution in
which the national voice can be heard loudest.
As to the types of discussion in the European Council, the London Declaration spells out
that there are both, (i) informal exchanges of view of a wide-ranging nature held in the
greatest privacy and not designed to lead to formal decisions or public statements. (ii)
discussions which are designed to produce decisions, settle guidelines for future action
or lead to the issue of public statements expressing the agreed view of the European
Council. A third function is to settle issues outstanding from discussions at a lower
level. Many statesmen regard informal exchanges of view as the most important function of
the European Council. (10) Foreign ministers are mostly excluded, and the number of
interpreters and note-takers is reduced to a minimum. (11) This, of course, adds to an
intimate atmosphere, keeping discussions as frank and informal as possible. 
Another important factor is personal acquaintance, shaping both European Council meetings
as well as diplomatic negotiations in the framework of summitry. Take into account what
Putnam and Bayne write about summitry: Personal acquaintance with their fellow leaders is
the effect of summitry most often stressed by summiteers and their closest aides. Unlike
bureaucrats (and academics), who are typically 'paper-readers', politicians are typically
'people-readers', for whom face-to-face exchanges are important. (12)
Although it is difficult, in the absence of any written records, to firmly establish
whether or not this informal exchange has contributed to building consensus within the
European Council, there is no doubt that such type of intercourse epitomizes informal
procedure and a low level of process rules - both important elements of diplomatic
negotiations and intergovernmentalism in general. In this context, it is telling and
helpful to notice that, unlike European Council meetings designed to lead to formal
statements and decisions, there is by agreement only very little preparation for informal
exchange of view, with Heads of Government informing each other or the Presidency a few
days beforehand of the subjects they will wish to discuss. (13) This, again, is an
indicator of the conspicuous lack of procedural rules, and thus of the informality and
almost ad hoc-nature of the process. However, bilateralism plays an important role in the
preparation. Although official bilateral meetings are not all that common (14),
bilateralism most visibly occurs any time the Presidency chooses to engage in 'shuttle
diplomacy', trying to create a package deal. Even apart from this visible bilateralism,
it is understood that bilateralism, in the form of partnerships, is an important core not
only of the preparation of European Council meetings, but indeed of its decision-making
too. One of the most obvious examples is the creation of the EMS, the initiative seized
by a close Franco-German collaboration. (15) In this regard, bilateralism is to be seen
as the nucleus of intergovernmentalism, almost ruling out other modes of governance. What
is more is that bilateralism is not only closely interwoven with intergovernmentalism
during the preparation stage, but also during the decision-making stage. Bilateralism
leads to issue linkages, log-rolling, support buying, and side payments - all elements of
traditional diplomatic negotiations and intergovernmentalism. Edward Heath, for example,
recalls that the primary purpose of the [European] Council was to permit chief executives
to propose compromises, issue linkages and side payments that ministers, bureaucratic
factions or domestic groups might otherwise block. (16)
The preparation of European Council meetings designed to generate public statements and
official decisions is, of course, more structured and detailed. The presidency-in-office
narrows down the possible points for agenda (17) as to what might be the ingredients for
a successful package deal. COREPER plays a key role in putting together a list of
possible agenda items, which is then discussed during an early exchange amongst foreign
ministers. Here, an early indication of national viewpoints takes place. Finally, the
agenda is circulated among a committee called Antici Group. Foreign ministers hold their
meeting in confidential session; the final setting of priorities is conducted orally.
This, again, proves the very low transparency of the whole process.
Why, then, should we not call the European Council an intergovernmental institution as
such? It is evolving more and more as a genuine Union organ, and as such becomes part of
the network and influences of other Community organs / procedures etc. For example, the
Commission may be pressing an initiative which the Presidency and at least some of the
states are sympathetic to (this was the background to the discussion and adoption of the
Social Charter at the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989). In that case, we
cannot properly call the mode of governance an intergovernmental one - rather, it tends
to move towards supranationalism.
Style of Intercourse. The negotiating process resembles a lowest-common-denominator
bargaining process. Due to a lack of input from EC institutions - there is no 'European
hegemon' (18) capable of providing universal threats or incentives - the negotiation
process reflects the relative power of the negotiating states and their interests.
Smaller States are bought off with side-payments; larger States may exercise a de facto
veto over certain items on the agenda. Therefore, the deal struck is more a
lowest-common-denominator bargain between the interests of the larger states. This is
certainly true for the SEA negotiation process, which overall represented a trilateral
deal between France, the UK, and Germany. A closer study of the preferences of these
three States between 1980 and 1986 drives this point home. (19) The only sector that
France, the UK and Germany agreed on in principle was the completion of the internal
market. How, then, can the procedural reform, above all the promotion of majority voting
on internal market matters, be explained? After all, who would have predicted the
introduction of majority voting in the Council before the SEA Intergovernmental
Conference decisions? The explanation may be found in yet another 'intergovernmental'
feature, namely the threat of exclusion. Mitterrand and Kohl repeatedly raised the
prospect of some sort of free trade area between France and Germany when negotiations
with UK became bogged down. The UK finally yielded to French-German pressure in order to
stay in the game, reacting to the threat of being excluded and losing say (the UK was
sensitive to this threat after not having joined the EC until the early 1970s, when many
important decisions -relating, in particular, to the CAP and budgetary practices
detrimental to Britain - had been made without its input). In addition, deep divisions
within the Conservative government weakened the UK's bargaining power in the
negotiations. (20) The trilateral nature of the deal becomes even clearer from the way
the other Member States behaved. The smaller States neither initiated nor vetoed a
central initiative (21). The southern states and Ireland were appeased through
side-payments in the form of increased structural funds (22), and the Benelux countries
had been prepared to go further than the others anyhow.
In contrast to what Moravcsik, in his rich description of the SEA negotiating process
(23), perceives as the borderline between 'supranational institutionalism' (nature of
bargaining = logrolling and linkages that upgrade the common interest of Member States)
and 'intergovernmental institutionalism' (nature of bargaining =
lowest-common-denominator [veto group] decisions among the largest Member States), I see
no reason why there shouldn't be any logrolling in EU intergovernmental decision-making
processes. Logrolling is a form of intertemporal do ut des (I give to get in return), and
the principle is that of postponed equivalent return. The precondition for this is,
therefore, a continuous decisional context, a future, so to speak. (24) Although there is
a low level of institutionalization in intergovernmental bargains, the situation here is
somewhat different from 'normal' intergovernmental (above all bilateral) bargaining in
that it is clear to each participant in the negotiation that there will be renewed close
contact about the same or similar issues in the near future. The intertemporal condition,
therefore, is met - there is a future. Hence, logrolling can be a decisive part of
intergovernmental negotiation, too, and is not confined to supranationalism (although it
is, admittedly, weaker on the intergovernmental level of EU governance).
Adoption. In further contrast to legislative bargaining, negotiators had to look for
consensus and could not rely, in general, on majoritarian decision-making. There were
only very few exceptions, one of which occurred during the run-up to the SEA. At Milan in
1985, a formal vote was taken on the establishment of the IGC which led to the SEA,
leaving the UK, Greece, and Denmark opposed. (25) As soon as the contents of
declarations, reports, presidency conclusions and so forth were not based on a consensus
of all Member States, the mode of decision-making ran into problems. This happened, for
instance, in the case of the 1983 Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart with its series of
footnotes expressing national reservations; the Dooge Report which also included
footnoted national reservations; and the conclusions of the 1985 Luxembourg summit which
contained a blanket reservation on the part of Denmark and a conditional acceptance only
on the part of Italy (depending on examination by the Italian Parliament). In addition,
the Commission does not enjoy, of course, the possibility of privileged amendment so
important in the supranational mode of governance; equally, the EP does not have any
say.
Result (and Disciplinary Background). The observer will look to the outcome of
intergovernmental bargaining with an IR frame of mind. However, it would not make sense,
of course, to postulate that the result of the intergovernmental process is politics (in
contrast to the result of the supranational mode as being law). Clearly, the SEA brought
about substantial amendments to the Treaties Establishing the EC and has to be
acknowledged as law. Still, we are dealing with a kind of law qualitatively different
from normal legislative outcomes. The issue of majority voting, for instance, is a very
sensitive and intractable one, and the authority of national leaders is required to
tamper with it. Other areas - such as the completion of the internal market, or
institutional issues such as Treaty revisions relating to the powers of the EP, to the
administrative powers of the Commission, and to the architecture of the legal system
(Court of First Instance) - clearly need a strong political impetus. The result is what
may be characterized as changes of major political and/or economic impact. However,
decisions on other levels of governance - even the infranational level - may result, by
way of incrementalism, in a major political and/or economic impact. Better
characterizations, therefore, would be change of fundamental system rules or
constitutional changes, though this is meant in a non-technical sense. Also, there may be
issues that need intergovernmental decisions although they do not share the grand
fundamental system rule or constitutional flair, but merely touch upon specific Member
State sensibilities, be they subtle or ludicrous. (See also infra C.)
Justiciability. The question of judicial review mirrors in a way the locus of power that
transpires through our previous findings. Whereas normally, the principle of judicial
supremacy of the Community is widely accepted, the ECJ in this case that cannot
judicially pronounce itself on the outcome of the intergovernmental process. The
comparison with a national constitutional court aspiring to declare unconstitutional a
constitutional amendment comes to mind (and reinforces both the exceptional /
constitutional nature of the result of intergovernmental decision-making). However,
national constitutional courts can pronounce themselves on the result of
intergovernmental bargaining, and sometimes (though rarely) they do (an obvious example
is the German Maastricht decision (26)). Here, therefore, it seems the power structure is
reversed: the Member States control and alter the Community structure (through their
organs - on the negotiation level through their governments, on the implementation level
through their parliaments or referenda, and on the judicial level through their courts).
Intergovernmentalism, from this perspective, is, among the three different levels of EU
governance, the one that illustrates best the nice German phrase of the Member States as
Herren der Vertrage (Masters of the Treaties).
More importantly, however, the issue of justiciabilty (through Member States
constitutional courts) points to the fact that for intergovernmentalism, the main arena
for possible democratic control and accountability is the domestic forum. I will come
back to this point later in this study.
B. Principal Actors and Players
It is almost banal to state that the principal actors are the Member States, acting
through their governments. This, however, can be specified, in a double sense,
'internally' and 'externally'. On the one hand, it is not the whole Government that acts.
Heads of State and of Governments and their direct representatives, not Foreign Ministers
or lower branches of the governments, carried out the negotiations leading to the SEA.
(27) On the other hand, other actors were generally restricted to very minor roles. I
have already hinted at the marginal input of the Commission and the EP. In addition, the
SEA negotiations have been launched independently from transnationally organized business
interest groups (28) (which, of course, should not be mixed up with interest groups
operating on the national level, exercising their influence mediated through Member
States governments). The Kangaroo Group in the EP was small at the time, and formal links
to the Council were not established until 1986. The Roundtable of European Industrialists
focused on infrastructural issues such as the Channel tunnel, and Dekker did not deliver
his speeches until after the Dooge Committee discussions were on their way and France had
assumed her pathbreaking presidency for nearly a year. (29) A few business groups such as
the UNICE had been pushing for liberalization for a long time - too long a time, however,
to attribute to them a significant role for the now suddenly moving field. Equally,
international political leaders (and here one could think above all of Delors and
Cockfield) did not play decisive roles. Counter-arguments might run as follows, but turn
out to be ultimately unconvincing: 1) The remarkable speed of the Conference can be
attributed to Delors. Maybe, but he did not alter the substance a bit. 2) Delors (and the
Commission) may have slipped new EC functions into the Treaty. However, the EC had been
handling these functions (environment, research and development programs) under indirect
authorization for years, and there was very little opposition from the Member States to
extending them formally. 3) Delors's conciliatory move in late September/early October
1985 to drop strong advocacy of monetary and social reform and to stress links between
internal market reform, majority voting, and structural funding, has facilitated
compromise. True, but his position was closely circumscribed by the views of the major
States and was in part even a reaction to direct pressure from domestic officials. 4)
Cockfield's White Paper was a key act of agenda setting. True, but the White Paper was a
response to a mandate from the Member States. (30)
C. Typical Issues of Governance
Take into account the options Delors faced:
Procedural reform without a substantive program, he realized, would get bogged down in
ideological battles over sovereignty; a plan for European monetary union would encounter
the opposition of the governors of the central banks, who, led by the Germans, had just
rejected an expansion of the EMS; and European defense cooperation was neither within the
current competence of the EC nor widely supported among the Member States. The sole
remaining option was internal market reform. (31)
All four agenda items do not emanate directly from the Treaty but constitute issues that
share the features of high sensitivity, of (at best) evolving existing Treaty provisions,
of being of high public awareness, of not being easy to agree on and therefore of
necessitating attention from the highest political authority possible. Intergovernmental
cooperation is needed when, inter alia, the following is to be achieved: defining the
guidelines for integration; goal identification; policy initiation, orientation and
co-ordination; scope enlargement; problem-solving.
The last point in particular - problem-solving - has me refrain from concluding that
intergovernmental processes deal essentially with high politics issues. The term 'high
politics' has been repeatedly criticized. (32) However, I will understand it as having no
intrinsic objective value but rather as being a matter of decision. If thus understood,
the puzzle of the 'problem-solving' aspect of intergovernmental cooperation is easily
solved. It is true, intergovernmental governance is concerned, too, with quite specific
policy issues such as sectoral policy deliberations. The explanation for this is that 1)
some issues are so sensitive and intractable that they require national leaders'
authority, and that 2) the intergovernmental sphere- due to its non-sectoral nature - is
the best place to put together package deals that are required to reach agreement on
issues that either cut across policy sectors, or that can only be resolved by linking
issues in one sector with issues in another. (33)
D. Level of Institutionalization
The negotiations leading to the SEA were characterized by a variety of institutional
designs none of which, however, reached a level that deserves the label 'high'. It is
equally true, on the other hand, that negotiations did not take place in complete chaos.
I have already mentioned different committees with specific mandates. The summits, as
also mentioned above, have been given a certain framework through the European Council.
However, both the European Council meetings (lacking established rules of procedure and
not acquiring a firm legal basis until the SEA was concluded) and especially bilateral or
trilateral diplomacy are characterized by high informality and flexibility, and therefore
only a low level of institutionalization.
E. Visibility / Transparency
The SEA negotiation process was extensively covered by the media, which is due to two
features: 1) the negotiated subject-matter was sensitive, even delicate (such as defense
co-operation) and of broad and immediate political interest; 2) the main actors were the
Heads of State and Governments, thus providing events and actors with high visibility.
In stark contrast to this, however, negotiation transparency was low. The flipside of
informal and flexible diplomatic negotiation is the fact that there are virtually no
records. Commentators have to gather background material from interviews and negotiators'
memoirs. In a sense, intergovernmental process finds itself in the tradition of 19th
century secret negotiations.
Part 2: Beyond the Monolithic Government
The study of intergovernmentalism within the European Union may, in part, happily and
fruitfully rely on conceptions that have been developed under the label of liberal
intergovernmentalism. While liberal intergovernmentalism has the considerable virtue of
breaking up the notion of the monolithic state (which is the reason why this study speaks
of intergovernmentalism rather than internationalism), it stops short of breaking up the
notion of a monolithic government. In contrast, I believe that it is of vital importance
to track domestic factors that, in turn, influence government action. Thus, while it is
true that governments, in the intergovernmental mode of governance, are the most
important actors, satisfactory analysis has to extend beyond the level of government as
an actor. The claim of this study is, incidentally, that this is true for all three modes
of governance.
In order to drive this point home, I will, again, engage in a case study. Choosing the
same example as in Part 1 - the negotiation of the SEA - I hope to demonstrate the
complexity of interests and influences beyond and below the governmental level. Infra
(I.), therefore, I shall briefly analyze the network of interests that led to the German
position in the SEA negotioations. Infra (II.) I shall then consider the factors that
need analytic attention in abstracto.
Bibliography
- Legitimacy and Accountability -
Ulrich R. Haltern