FREE ESSAY ON HOW SYSTEMATIC WERE PETER THE GREAT'S PLANS FOR MEETING RUSSIA'S NEEDS AND HOW EFFECTIVELY DID HE CARRY THEM OUT?

HOW SYSTEMATIC WERE PETER THE GREAT'S PLANS FOR MEETING RUSSIA'S NEEDS AND HOW EFFECTIVELY DID HE CARRY THEM OUT?

When Peter inherited the throne in Russia in 1689, he was dismayed by its backwardness.
His vision was to Westernise it. To answer the essay question, I first need to identify
the needs of Russia. These were to improve the economy of Russia, to harness the support
of the nobility, improve defence and administration, enhance diplomatic ties with the
West, to secure ice free ports, and to improve education.
Peter found answers to many of his problems in Russia by transplanting ideas from the
West. When he said after his humiliation at Narva that Russia would learn from the Swedes
how eventually to defeat them, he was expressing his underlying attitude to change. In
1697-1699, he went on a Grand Tour of England and Holland called the Embassy to the West.
This was for diplomatic and technological reasons - to harness support of the West
against the Turks and bring back skilled workers to Russia. After visiting Versailles in
1717, Peter began to upgrade the courtly image, employing a variety of foreign artists
and architects. However, his main emphasis was still practical, as shown by the fact that
the most important building housed the Senate and Colleges, not court. Peter promoted
direct contact with French, Dutch, German, and English cultures and removed his court
from the conservative atmosphere of the Kremlin and established a new capital at St.
Petersburg. Peter's vision was on a far grander scale than Louis XIV's however, as it can
be said the problem of Paris was solved by Versailles, that of the Kremlin by St
Petersburg. Peter was also open to the influence of western advisers in trying to promote
commercial enterprise to build up a class of entrepreneurs. He was also determined to
introduce new fashions, based largely on those in the West. Beards and traditional
Russian clothes were either banned or heavily taxed. Under Western influence, Peter
introduced a number of humanitarian measures - Moscow's first pharmacies and hospitals as
well as promoting homes for the destitute. There was also some development with
literature and the arts. This is shown by the replacement of the old religious alphabet
with the modern 'civil' script and Arabic numerals, and the introduction of the Western
Calendar. Furthermore, in his economic reforms, Peter was influenced by western
mercantilist policies, for example the 1725 tariff to raise import duties.
Economic precedents were set by Peter, influenced by Western techniques and theories. He
sought to transform the Russian economy by a new policy of hybridisation. His major
achievement was in transferring the centre of commercial gravity from Archangel and the
White Sea to St. Petersburg and the more accessible Baltic. In 1710, 153 foreign ships
were using Archangel, however by 1724, 240 foreign ships used St. Petersburg as the port
of entry to Russia. Furthermore, Peter planned to improve industry. Companies were given
state loans to kick-start industry, for example in 1696, the first ironworks was
established in Russia and by 1725, there were 86 ironworks established. At first Peter
gave priority to armaments needed in the war with Sweden but, in the second half of the
reign, also sought to enlarge and diversify the industrial base by promoting consumer
goods such as silk and china. Peter also tried (but failed) to join the Baltic and Black
Seas by canal. However, it can be said that the economic changes were piecemeal and
unsystematic, without, according to Florinsky, plan or proper co-ordination, the various
measures, indeed, frequently working at cross-purposes.
Peter believed that the traditional system, dominated by the church, was incapable of
delivering the sorts of changes that he considered Russia needed as the basis for his
proposed transformation. Peter again looked to the technical and scientific knowledge of
the West, sending groups abroad at various stages during his reign. In 1701, he
established the School of Mathematics and Navigation, and later that year founded the
Artillery Academy. The Gluck Gymnasium specialising in politics and western languages
followed in 1705, followed by the Engineering Academy 1712, Naval Academy 1715, School of
Mines 1716, and Academy of Sciences 1724. Peter also established elementary or 'cipher'
schools to teach literacy and numeracy, of which there were 40 by 1722. Garrison schools
were established and a decree issued in 1714 that the gubernii should each set up two
mathematical schools. Most of these institutions used basic textbooks introduced during
Peter's reign. A public library was founded in 1719 and Peter laid plans for the
foundation of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. 
In addition, Peter introduced a Table of Ranks in 1722 in order to bring Russian nobility
into state service. Official rank had to be earned and service to the state was arduous.
Nobles had to have a life long obligation to the state and adopt a career in military,
civil, or legal service. This was possibly the most carefully thought through of all
Peters reforms and was a system of service to the state based on well-tried principles
from abroad (in particular Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia). 
Peter wanted to give Russia good and solid institutions and make her a regulated state.
He was often absent from government on military campaigns so it was crucial for a
reliable system of government to be set up in his absence. He created the senate in 1711
to co-ordinate every branch of government. Muscovite chancelleries (Prikazy) had already
provided an administration network in Russia, which, to some extent, Peter streamlined.
He did this using the deliberate imitation of the Swedish system of colleges acting on
the information systematically gathered between 1716 and 1718 by Heinrich Fick. The
senate was therefore, the hub of government, the Colleges were the spokes linking it to
day to day execution of orders. Peter also tried to reorganise the provincial government.
He decided to divide Russia into eight regions (or gubernii) each ruled by a military
governor in 1709. This was increased to 11 in 1719 and Peter tried to make this a
permanent settlement based on the Swedish system.
The Russian Orthodox Church was an independent body and incredibly autonomous at the
start of Peter's reign. However, Peter aimed for a state-controlled church, which
included complete overhaul of ecclesiastical administration and redirection of monastic
revenues. The patriarch was abolished in 1721 and replaced by a Holy Synod, run by a High
Procurator (chosen by Peter). The church surrendered its autonomy and the clergy had to
swear an oath 'to defend unsparingly all the powers, rights, and prerogatives belonging
to the High Autocracy of His Majesty'. All decrees put out by the Holy Synod were stamped
by order of his Imperial Majesty. Ecclesiastical administration was therefore integrated
fully into the bureaucracy and subjected to the same regulations and restrictions. This
was supplemented by powerful propaganda. Prokopovich wrote the 'Right of the Monarchical
Will' in 1722 to justify Peter's absolutism. 
Peter planned to increase state revenue by two main methods. Firstly, he introduced a
variety of taxes. Many were indirect (on items such as beards, salt, and tobacco) but
direct taxes were increased even more. In 1718, a new 'soul' (or poll) tax was
introduced. The second method was more of an expedient: the debasement of the currency
through the reduction of the silver content and its substitution by base metals
During his reign, Peter successfully increased the size of the army, transformed its
structure, and equipped it with modern weapons, artillery, and training manuals, acquired
from the west. Peter also planned to modernise the navy and increase its size. He
introduced modern conscription methods, made exemption from the army difficult, and
provinces were made responsible for army units. His major preoccupation during the Great
Embassy to the West was to acquaint himself with new techniques of naval construction at
Zaandam and Deptford. He brought back with him from his Grand Tour at lest fifty
shipbuilders from Europe. The infrastructure for the navy was also carefully developed.
Six and a quarter million roubles was spent on building the Admiralty Quay in St.
Petersburg and the Kronstadt naval base, while the admiralty itself became one of the
largest enterprises in Europe. Underlying these developments was an increasingly complex
administrative structure based on the navy prikaz set up in 1698, followed by the
admiralty prikaz in 1701, and the admiralty college in 1718.
Peter's first effective campaign, against Azov in 1696, followed months of intensive
shipbuilding. He had previously lost against Turkey at Azov the previous year, but
carefully planned again in order to obtain a port on the Black Sea. Peter's battle
against Sweden at Narva, however, was not at all systematic and his troops were badly
equipped and not well trained. Consequently, the Russian army was badly defeated.
Therefore, as a necessity, between 1701 and 1709 Peter built up his army and was
victorious against Sweden at Poltova in 1709. 
It can therefore be said that Peter's changes were prompted only by military necessity.
War was a catalyst for change, largely because Peter had no deep attachment to Muscovite
traditions and was prepared to use any methods to update them. It was also this
'iconoclastic attitude' which enabled him to respond positively to defeat at Narva in
1700 and convert the prospect of immediate collapse into longer-term revival.
Furthermore, Peter's Russia can be described as a 'state at war' as the conflict with
Sweden (and to some extent Turkey) profoundly affected the domestic scene and was the key
influence behind Peter's various economic reforms. Lentin argues, The changes wrought by
Peter between 1700 and 1709 stemmed...from the immediate exigencies of war. Since Peter's
priority was the effective mobilisation of Russian resources to defeat Sweden,
institutions had to be examined, overhauled, or even replaced. The struggle with Most of
the other transformations that Peter brought about in Russian life stemmed from the
necessity of recruiting the men for these forces and raising the revenue for financing
the wars they fought. (E.N.Williams). Seventy-five percent of revenue was spent on army
and navy in 1701, increasing to eighty percent in 1710. As the reign progressed, the
measures taken to increase the revenue and supply the army exerted an impact on the other
sectors of the economy. Emphasis on culture was also influenced by the demands of war,
which meant priority was given to the languages and sciences, to navigation, shipbuilding
and engineering. Anderson agrees War and the demands it generated were the mainspring of
much of Peters innovating and creative activity in Russia
It is difficult to assess how effectively Peter carried out his plans for meeting
Russia's needs. In 1721, a decree was issued to ensure serfs were sold as family units,
thus preventing the break up of families. Another decree of 1719 stated that a cruel
noble might be deprived of his estates (but this was rarely checked). However, despite
this, the peasants played a huge price for the changes made by Peter during his reign.
Peter had made all peasants into serfs and divided them into two main groups - state
serfs and bonded serfs. State serfs were drafted into construction projects such as the
building of St. Petersburg, which extracted a heavy toll in lives (a fresh supply of
40,000 a year were used). Furthermore, all serfs were liable to military conscription for
periods of 25 years. The fivefold increase in taxation was certainly borne by the
long-suffering Russian population. They were adversely affected by the soul tax in 1718,
which imposed heavy financial burden and increased their dependence on the nobility who
supervised their payments. However, it was the introduction of the passport system in
1724 (designed to control movement between estates and prevent evasion from conscription)
which most depressed the status of the peasantry. It can therefore be stated that Peter
subordinated the lives and liberties of his subjects to his own conception of the welfare
of the state. Like many of his successors, he concluded that ruthless reform was
necessary to overcome Russia's backwardness.
The navy transformed Russia from a land-locked military state into one of Europe's
largest naval powers, having nearly 850 warships by 1725 and by the end of his reign, the
size of the fleet had grown to 800 galleys and 48 ships of the line. He also forced every
landowner to supply one ship for every 10,000 serf households under their control. The
navy was responsible for the only real gains against Turkey and played a complementary,
but vital, role in the struggle against Sweden. Although Swedish military might was
broken by the army in Poltava, it was the navy which ensured the collapse of Sweden's
empire in the Baltic through the victory at Cape Hango in 1714 and the capture of the
Aaland Islands. Therefore, the navy enabled Peter to adopt a more global strategy and to
extend the range of the conflict to Finland and even the Swedish mainland. Above all, it
was the success of the Russian navy that eventually pressurised Sweden into accepting the
terms of the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721. As a result of the victory, the Russian Empire
was formed on Oct. 22 1721. On that day Peter was acclaimed Father of the Fatherland,
Peter the Great, and emperor of all the Russia's, by the Russian Senate, in gratitude for
victory in the war. 
Russia could not have emerged as the victor over Sweden at Poltava without Peter's
military reforms. She could only have survived, weakened, and depleted. As it was, Russia
had an army of 200,000 by 1725 and at Peter's funeral it was said he had found an army
disorderly at home...weak in the field...He created one that was terrible to the enemy
and glorious everywhere. Russia moved through the eighteenth century as one of the
continents four military powers, her troops reaching the Rhine during the War of the
Austrian Succession (1740-1747) and providing the greatest threat to Frederick the
Great's Prussia during the Seven Years War (1756-63). The military changes were also
responsible for the establishment of the new administrative structure. The army even
permeated the offices within this structure Army chiefs occupied commanding positions in
the central offices, army veterans staffed the civil administration, and army units
intervened actively in civil affairs. (Yaney).
However, the military reforms were not completely effective. Against the Turks, for
example, in 1711 there was military failure. In addition, there were problems throughout
the army. At the highest level, there had been long-standing friction and rivalry between
the leading generals, which reached a new intensity in the relations between Sheremetev,
Menshikov, and Repnin. Lower down, the quality of officers remained so variable that no
amount of foreign imports could guarantee consistently effective command. At the bottom,
the army was vulnerable to desertion on a massive scale. If anything, this problem was
exacerbated by Peter's decrees on recruitment, which virtually ensured that peasant
conscripts were swallowed up into the army for life.
Succumbing largely to state control, the Church became effectively a government
department. This meant the ecclesiastical hierarchy underpinned the state power and
upheld the principle of Tsarist autocracy. In addition, freed from its theocratic
constraints, the church established a more direct contact with and impact in the minds of
the people. 
The education system was also ineffective as the different types of schools struggled to
survive in direct competition to each other. In addition, all institutions suffered from
insufficient funding and an inadequate supply of teachers. Within a few years of being
set up, many schools closed, partly due to the ingrained idea that secular knowledge was
evil. Peter had neither the resources nor the inclination to equip Russia with a broad
educational base that might serve eventually to challenge the social structure and even
autocracy itself.
The Table of Ranks generally had a positive impact on the nobility and brought them under
state control. However, the effects were limited as the top grades were still taken by
traditional nobility, while the older families kept their titles, irrespective of
service.
Peter's system of debasing the coinage tided the government over during the first stage
of the war with Sweden. Then, after 1718, the yield of direct taxes went up considerably
due to the introduction of the soul tax - from 1.8 million roubles to 4.6 million in the
first year. The total revenues grew steadily from 3 million roubles in 1701 to 8.5
million in 1724. This meant that even after two decades of war the fulfilment of massive
schemes such as he construction of a new fleet and the building of a new capital, there
were no loans payable to foreign countries. Throughout the reign Peter balanced the
budget and raised all funds from domestic sources. Furthermore, the number of
manufactures was increased from 21 in 1682 o over 200 by 1725, and some of these had no
equal in Europe in terms of sheer size. Overall, it can therefore be said that Peter
provided a financial and industrial base, which enabled Russia to survive as Europe's
largest political entity.
However, industry became largely dependent on state direction and support as Peter made
available the capital investment, which Russia had previously been lacking. The major
difficulties were shortage of capital and backwardness of labour. The sources of capital
were restricted to the nobility and the merchant class, many of whom were unwilling to
risk their wealth in uncertain enterprise. Labour was also undermined by the
inflexibility of serfdom, which seriously inhibited attempted changes in the future.
Russia never experienced the type of industrial revolution, which occurred in Britain or
Germany, which depended on entrepreneurial capitalism. Foreign trade also depended on
government support and initiative and never succeeded in matching the English and Dutch
carrying trade. All Peter therefore managed to do was edge Russia a little closer to the
stage of evolution that would make possible the type of revolution advocated by Marx, the
overturn of the entire social and economic base.
Peter was less successful in agriculture than in industry. His reforming edicts were
fragmentary and were not part of an overall coherent policy. He failed to raise the level
of agriculture as backwardness, low productivity and wastage were still recurrent
problems.
The college system had the potential to be highly effective but in practice, it was
difficult to link to the provincial government simply due to the immense size of Russia.
Furthermore, local government not successful area at all. The main function of these
governments was to collect taxes and do municipal work but the latter was often
disregarded. Finance was often tight and officials unpaid. Therefore, within a few years,
the system was a crumbling facade. The system was ineffective and subject to blackmail,
and a third of the revenue never even reached the treasury. 
In conclusion, education, economy, defence, and industry were all improved during Peter's
reign through largely systematic means. However, Dukas believes that Peter's reforms in
government as elsewhere were improvised rather than carefully planned, particularly in
the beginning. Indeed, after Russia's victory at Poltava in 1709, there was more evidence
of planning, inspired by Western influence. Initially, changes were introduced rapidly by
Peter with minimum research and preparation as his country was amidst a major war.
Consequently, Peter's attempt to build industry and defence related entirely to the needs
of war and he was guided largely by necessity. However, later in his reign, there was
more time to rationalise and structure and the emphasis changed. For example, Peter
became more interested in other kinds of manufacturing - those designed to raise Russian
life to the level of the West and make Russia less dependent on imports from abroad.
The reforms made on the army and navy, and also in administration and the nobility, were
effectively carried out and in 29 short years, Peter the Great had revolutionised his
land and turned it forcibly toward the west. Gaurila Derzhavin, the 18th century Russian
poet, asked: "Was it not God, who in person, came down to earth?" The army, navy, and the
revenue of Russia all dramatically increased during Peter's reign. However, this was at a
cost. The quality of life of the serfs was reduced and, by trying to Westernise Russia,
some felt that Peter had permanently damaged the very fabric of traditional society by
introducing alien ideas and institutions. Bewildered and stunned by the tornado that
descended upon them, many of his people did not understand him and considered him a
devil. Furthermore, the education and local government reforms were not at all
effectively accomplished and soon deteriorated. As Oppenheim wrote, Peter left a mixed
legacy to his successors, Russia had emerged as a Great Power, but with serious social
and administrative problems unsolved. Peter had no clear system of government, expecting
simply to give orders and for others to carry them out. He left a regime which was
understaffed and inefficient and one in which even minor decisions had to be referred to
the Tsar. 
Bibliography
Russia in the Eighteenth Century A.Lentin
Europe in the Eighteenth Century 1713-1783 M.S.Anderson
Peter the Great Stephen J.Lee
Europe in the Seventeenth Century Maland