FREE ESSAY ON ESCALATION OF VIETNAM

ESCALATION OF VIETNAM

Mr. President:
It is my observation that at this point in your administration you are enjoying
considerable latitude with the American public. Your overwhelming victory in the recent
election has illustrated your popularity. The platform on which you ran promised the
American public that our boys would not be sent to die in Vietnam. If you are going to
act on your word, and end the war in Vietnam, the time is now.
It is also my observation that your top aides having been overwhelming you with advice in
the opposite direction. Your beloved Robert McNamara, whose opinion you value deeply, has
made this war his personal project. He is guaranteeing that the war can be won within two
and a half years. He has stated that there is no risk of a catastrophe. He and General
Westmoreland feel confident that the war can be won. However, they have continually been
asking for more and more troops since mid-1964. You have already agreed to send more
marines and authorize offensive operations. If there is no limit set on the number of
troops, it becomes easier and easier to keep sending them. 
What is our clear military objective? Do our military leaders have a strategic plan for
victory? Again in June, General Westmoreland has asked for more troops. After McNamara
was sent in July to assess the situation in Saigon, he returned with the request to raise
the American presence from 75,000 to 175,000 with a possible 100,000 more to follow. Does
this sound like the promises you have made to the American public? The goals of your
administration, the Great Society, will have to be halted and perhaps never completed
should you lose the support of the public and Congress. 
In your recent meeting on July 21st with your top aides, it is evident that you feel you
are continuing down the right path towards escalation. George Bundy has become militant
in his stance, and is urging you to escalate and not to be deterred by the risk of a
ground war with China. Dean Rusk is finally embracing the bombing and the dispatch of
troops, stressing the importance of doing whatever was needed "to throw back Hanoi-Viet
Cong aggression without a major war if possible." McNamara, to whom fell the
responsibility for overseeing this new American conflict seems of two minds. He has
bemoaned the heavy military emphasis on the operation and even expressed an interest in
putting the Vietnam issue before an international forum for discussion. But now, he has
become impatient for getting down to the details of winning and feels that abandoning
Vietnam would produce "a complete shift in the world balance of power" and would have bad
domestic repercussions, including "a disastrous political fight" and even an erosion of
political freedom. On the other hand, saving Vietnam would, he argued, have a range of
benefits, including setting the stage for efforts at economic development and population
control in a "gigantic arc from South Vietnam to Iran and the Middle East, ... proving
the worth of a moderate, democratic way of growth for societies."
Favoring my position is Undersecretary of State George Ball. He has been perhaps the most
persistent critic of escalation, and has repeatedly stressed the implications involved in
sending American troops. They would go into Vietnam as foreigners lacking local
cooperation and good intelligence in fighting in unfavorable jungle terrain. On July
21st, Ball one last time warned you that for the United States as with France earlier, "a
long protracted war will disclose our weakness, not our strength." American troops would
be fighting in a hostile environment on terms to be decided by the enemy for survival of
a weak and unstable government that would constantly run the risk of Chinese
intervention. President Johnson you are worried about the loss of national credibility if
you do not honor the repeated commitments made to South Vietnam. The worst blow would be
that the mightiest power in the world is unable to defeat guerillas.
It must feel natural to continue at this point of the war. You have public approval for
the bombing and escalation. Congress has proved their support by the Tonkin Gulf
resolution, and has confirmed its intentions in May by offering overwhelming support for
additional appropriations to intensify efforts in Vietnam. Congressional leaders have
given you their backing. Even the media has played a consensus-building role by picturing
Vietnam as this administration sees it: as part of the Cold War struggle.
Mr. President, I need not remind you how fickle the American public has been on this
issue. Before the Tonkin Gulf clash, almost two-thirds of the public knew little about
Vietnam, and those who did were deeply divided. After the February 1965 bombing, several
influential Americans and critics in the Senate began to speak out. By March, college
campuses had broken out into protests with faculty teaching out against your policy. You
have seen the effects of the Korean War on Truman's presidency. We have learned that the
public has no taste for Asian land wars. If you choose to continue, you will be falling
into your own portrayal of Senator Barry Goldwater whom you ruthlessly depicted as a man
leading the American troops into a dangerous conflict. 
Mr. President, I realize that you are a man who rises to meet challenges and does not
accept defeat. I also realize that in your role as president you feel obligated to
continue on with the Cold War policies that have long given shape to U.S. Vietnam policy.
I encourage you to reassess this policy and not feel obligated to continue down the wrong
path. There are power stakes involved here, Mr. President, and quite frankly if you do
not succeed by escalating, your presidency will become under fire, and you will never
achieve your goals of the Great Society.
I am recommending that we follow Ball's recommendation of permitting the Vietcong to
campaign in the free elections. We would not agree to any arrangement worked out on these
terms without insisting that the Viet Cong units in the South be broken up and that the
Viet Cong be absorbed into the national life of the country. The free elections would
pose a problem, but if we asked intermediaries (Sweden, the Soviets, etc.) to make clear
to Hanoi that we would accept this position, it could have a chance for negotiations.
There would need to be a pause in the bombing, in order to send a representative to
discuss the matter. The pause would assure Hanoi that we are serious in negotiating. It
is critical that our position be articulated and understood by the Viet Cong, so no
confusion and misinterpretation result.
I understand the situation in Saigon is critical, and you must act quickly. I urge you
not to do anything rash without pursuing these options. We are an elite and prosperous
nation. We will not fall from our throne should you decide not to extend our commitment.
The United States may face some immediate repercussions in the global community, but in
my opinion the security of the United States will not be compromised in this act. While
the threat of Soviet expansionism is first and foremost on everyone's minds, we must
listen to the wishes of the public whom you have been elected to represent. You have been
elected because you vowed not to send American soldiers to die in Saigon. As a man of
integrity I urge you to follow through on your word. Vietnam is a struggle for social
injustice and national sovereignty. These people are not going to give up for any reason
whatsoever. There are deep nationalistic ideologies at the heart of the Vietnamese people
that will not be conquered no matter what scale invasion the U.S. plans. Put your
personal implications aside and consider the implications for the nation as a whole. 
You are the leader of this country; your advisors are not. Remember that these men are
the men of Jack Kennedy's circle. You were not in the position to appoint your own
advisers, and this must be remembered when listening to their advice. We are not losing
the war by not escalating. You will earn the respect of the American people in the long
run, and will be able to focus more attention on your great love, the Great Society.